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Abstract 
 
There are marked differences in productivity dynamics between countries as well as 
industries, often leading to substantial performance gaps, such as the gap in labour 
productivity between the EU and the US. In this article, we use the 2019 release of the EU 
KLEMS database to look into the drivers of productivity.  In particular, we analyse how 
different types of capital (including intangible capital), foreign direct investment, integration 
into global value chains and EU integration affect labour productivity. Key findings are that 
intangible Information and Communication Technology (ICT) capital is a strong driver of 
productivity both at sectoral and aggregate levels, even more so than tangible ICT capital. 
Furthermore, backward global value chain integration and EU integration are positively 
associated with labour productivity. Contrary to expectations, we do not find evidence of a 
productivity-enhancing effect of foreign direct investment. Finally, we estimate by how much 
the productivity gap between the EU and the US could be reduced through different ICT 
investment policies. 
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1. Introduction 
While EU-15 countries were catching up to the US in terms of productivity until the mid-
1990s, this trend reversed around the year 1995 (van Ark, O‘Mahony and Timmer, 2008). 
Since then, the productivity gap continuously widened between the EU-15 Member States and 
the US – an effect even more pronounced during the economic crisis of 2008-2009 (Timmer 
et al., 2011). Within the EU, despite a convergence process of new EU members toward the 
EU average, there are still large differences in absolute productivity levels of eastern and 
Mediterranean countries and core countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France and 
Germany. Both the US and the EU were affected by a slowdown in productivity growth after 
2005, albeit the US to a lesser extent (Inklaar et al., 2020; OECD, 2019). Drivers of both, 
productivity itself, and the slowdown in productivity are still not well understood (Bauer et 
al., 2020). 
In this paper, we perform an econometric analysis of the drivers of labour productivity, 
focusing in particular on the accumulation of different types of capital (including intangible 
capital), foreign direct investment, integration into global value chains (GVCs) and EU 
integration. Our analysis covers the years 2000 to 2017 and a majority of EU countries, as 
well as Japan and the US.1 Furthermore, we perform two back-of-the envelope calculations to 
illustrate the magnitude of these effects, by estimating the change in average EU labour 
productivity levels and in the EU-US productivity gap, induced by different ICT investment 
policies.  
We come to five main conclusions: First, we find ICT capital, both tangible and intangible, to 
be a strong driver of productivity growth across the sample. According to our estimates, a 1-
percentage point (pp) increase in the growth of the real tangible ICT capital stock increases 
real labour productivity growth by 0.06 pp. A 1-pp increase in the growth of intangible ICT 
capital (i.e. software and databases) increases labour productivity growth by 0.09 pp. Results 
regarding other types of capital are too ambiguous to make general statements. There is, 
however, a marked difference between the manufacturing and agricultural sector groups, in 
which some sectors are affected by some types of capital, and the service sectors for which no 
significant effect at all could be found. Second, further drivers of productivity growth, but to a 
lesser extent, are backward GVC participation as well as EU integration. Third, contrary to 
our expectations, FDI does not have a significant effect on labour productivity growth, after 
controlling for capital composition, special purpose entities and low-tax outlier countries. This 
is consistent with the hypothesis that, in the European case, FDI targets countries with already 
high levels of productivity, and hence would not contribute per se to further productivity 
growth (Hale and Xu, 2016). Fourth, building on the previous three results, we infer that at 
least a part of the productivity gap between the EU and its peer economies (USA, Japan) can 
be explained by relatively lower intensity of investment in tangible and intangible ICT capital 
in many EU countries.2 Fifth, we estimate that average labour productivity in the EU could be 
increased by 7.1% if lagging EU countries increased their levels of tangible ICT capital per 
person employed to US-levels and by 7.3% in the case of intangible ICT capital. This would 
reduce the EU-US productivity gap by 25.2% for the case of tangible and 28.3% for the case 
of intangible ICT capital. A further estimate shows that an EU-wide investment of 100bn 
EUR into tangible ICT capital would increase labour productivity by 1.7% (2.7% for 
intangible ICT capital) and would reduce the EU-US productivity gap by 6.1% (9.5% for 
intangible capital).    
                                              
1
 The sample of countries is determined by the availability of the data in the EU KLEMS database. EU KLEMS allows to 
differentiate between different types of tangible and intangible capital, which is central to our analysis (for more details see 
Adarov and Stehrer, 2019a). 
2
 This result supports the earlier empirical findings reported in Timmer et al., 2010 and Van Ark et al., 2002. 
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There is a large literature on the relationship between capital investment and productivity, 
suggesting that capital structure matters for economic performance and that ICT capital is 
particularly conducive for productivity (see, for example, Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000; Oliner 
and Sichel, 2000; Stiroh 2002, 2005; Oliner et al. 2007; Strauss and Samkharadze, 2011; 
Spiezia, 2013; Wilson, 2009, but also Acemoglu et al. 2014 for more mixed results). ICT 
capital, being a general-purpose technology, has multiple channels through which it may 
influence broad-based productivity at the country level, including faster and more efficient 
communication, better data management practices and enhanced data flow, thereby also 
reducing information inefficiencies and fostering knowledge creation and transfer. Taking a 
comparative perspective, a number of scholars also attributed lower productivity in the EU in 
comparison with the USA to the lack of ICT investments in the former (Timmer et al., 2010; 
Van Ark et al., 2002). The importance of intangible capital in driving productivity growth has 
been studied in Corrado et al. (2006) and Corrado et al. (2017). However, measuring the role 
of intangible capital has been a challenge due to prevailing data constraints. One of the main 
novelties of this paper is to include previously unavailable data on intangible capital in the 
analysis. 
The EU-internal heterogeneity of productivity has traditionally been discussed as the gap 
between core (i.e. central northern export-oriented) countries with high productivity levels 
and periphery countries (see e.g. Iversen et al. 2016). Recent literature further distinguishes 
eastern European countries, which exhibit relatively high levels of productivity growth and 
which appear to be on a catch-up trajectory towards the core group (Bohle, 2017) and 
financial hubs, which includes countries such as Ireland, Luxemburg, Malta and the 
Netherlands (Gräbner et al., 2019). The literature suggests a wide range of causes for these 
productivity gaps, such as low levels of investment in ICT capital (Biagi, 2013, Timmer et al., 
2010) and R&D (Castellani et al., 2018). We add to this literature by including the latest data 
on ICT capital and by specifically analysing the role of FDI, GVC integration and intangible 
capital. 
The ways through which foreign direct investment (FDI) might positively influence 
productivity in the host countries, perhaps to a greater extent than domestic capital, include 
the transfer of technology, improvements in management efficiency, as well as by generally 
increasing competition. At the same time, investments made by multinational corporations 
(MNEs) may not necessarily lead to a positive and significant effect per se, as this might 
depend on the absorptive capacity of the host countries and their industries. Borensztein et al. 
(1998), for instance, report that FDI facilitates productivity only when the host country 
reaches a certain threshold level of human capital. Having surveyed 30 papers, Hale and Xu 
(2016), suggest that the effects differ in advanced and developing countries: While the impact 
on productivity is more profound in developing countries, in advanced countries it is mixed. 
A related issue is the effect of GVC participation on productivity. In theory, participation in 
global value chains should provide an opportunity for productivity gains due to knowledge 
spillovers, greater specialisation in certain tasks, interaction with international frontier firms 
and increased competition from foreign firms (Criscuolo and Timmis, 2017). The positive 
link between GVC participation and labour productivity is confirmed by the empirical 
literature, see for instance Kummritz (2016), Jona-Lasinio and Meliciani (2019) and Pahl and 
Timmer (2019).   
Our main contribution to the literature is as follows: We analyse different drivers of 
productivity based on a sample of EU countries, Japan and the USA, spanning the period 
2000-2017. We thus also take into account the post-crisis years characterised by a major 
productivity slowdown. Besides looking into the role of FDI, GVC participation and EU 
integration, we also focus explicitly on the role of digital capital (i.e. intangible ICT capital). 
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To our knowledge, the latter has not yet been empirically assessed – apart from very few 
exceptions (e.g. Corrado et al., 2006, 2017) – due to data constraints. For this purpose, we 
take advantage of the new EU KLEMS 2019 data (see Adarov and Stehrer, 2019a) and 
analyse the productivity impacts based on fourteen different capital asset classes, also 
grouping them into tangible and intangible assets. This approach allows to simultaneously 
distinguish between ICT and non-ICT capital on the one hand and intangible and tangible 
capital assets on the other hand, which is particularly instrumental to understanding the 
impact of digital capital. We derive our main results at the aggregate country level, but also 
study the sectoral level to avoid possible aggregation biases. Apart from the manufacturing 
sectors, we also analyse the primary and the services sectors, while the literature has focused 
largely on manufacturing.  
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we describe the data used for the econometric 
analysis. Section 3 contains descriptive statistics on productivity patterns, different capital 
structures, GVC integration and FDI flows in different countries. In Section 4 we carry out the 
econometric analysis of the drivers of productivity. In Section 5 we discuss the policy 
implications and conclude.  
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2. Data and sample 
For the purposes of econometric analysis we assemble a panel dataset that includes aggregate 
country- and sector-level variables of labour productivity, hours worked, labour composition, 
FDI, capital stocks and composition by asset types and other variables employed in the 
econometric analysis. The sample composition is largely determined by the availability of the 
data in the key data sources, particularly the EU KLEMS database, which covers EU 
countries and, among non-EU countries, only the USA and Japan. We drop low tax-countries 
known to be FDI-outliers3, as well as countries for which data for the key variables of interest 
is missing or too short. The resulting panel dataset covers 20 countries over the period 2000-
2017 (Table 2.1).4 
 
Table 2.1. Sample of countries for the econometric analysis in Section 4 
Country ISO3 code  Country ISO3 code 
Austria AUT  Greece GRC 
Belgium BEL  Italy ITA 
Czech Republic CZE  Lithuania LTU 
Germany DEU  Latvia LVA 
Denmark DNK  Portugal PRT 
Spain ESP  Slovak Republic SVK 
Estonia EST  Slovenia SVN 
Finland FIN  Sweden SWE 
France FRA  United States USA 
United Kingdom GBR  Japan JPN 
Note: This is the sample of countries used in the econometric analysis in Section 4 . For the descriptive statistics in 
Section 3 we include additional countries. 
 
The FDI data is compiled using the Eurostat and the OECD data, depending on which source 
offers longer series for a given country and bridging to the extent possible the gaps in the 
data. The OECD and Eurostat use a common framework for reporting FDI statistics and thus 
the resulting data are internally consistent across the country-sector and time dimensions. In 
general, we follow the conventions and methods used by the Eurostat/OECD framework 
described in the 4th edition of the OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 
BMD4. Importantly, our dataset excludes special purpose entities (SPEs) from the FDI data. 
SPEs are entities that primarily engage in holding activities and facilitate internal financing of 
multinational enterprises, but have little or no physical presence in the host economy, which 
severely distorts the FDI data and adversely affects economic inference in formal analysis, 
particularly, for countries hosting financial centres. Together with dropping low-tax   
                                              
3
 In particular, we remove Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Ireland and the Netherlands from the sample, consistent with the list of 
low-tax countries suggested in Hines (2010). 
4
 Given the change in the NACE classification during the period 2000-2017 in order to compile a dataset internally consistent 
across countries and sectors for the entire time period, we devised a sectoral classification (based on NACE Rev.2). More 
specifically, in the original Eurostat database the sectoral FDI data for the period 2000-2007 (for some countries 2009) are 
available according to BPM5 in NACE Rev.1; from 2008-2012 the data are available in BPM5 and according to NACE Rev.2; 
from 2013-2016 these data are according to BPM6 and NACE Rev.2. The resulting classification is reported in Table 2.2, l isting 
the corresponding NACE Rev.2 codes and labelling conventions used in the paper (the detailed mapping of sectors from 
different NACE versions is available from the authors on request).  
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countries this approach allows to focus only on the FDI dynamics with real economic 
relevance in the context of the productivity analysis. 
 
 
Table 2.2. Classification of sectors 
Note: the table shows the classification of sectors used in the paper with the numerical codes (SEC), corresponding NACE 
Rev. 2 codes, full sector name (based on NACE Rev.2) and short labels used for the brevity of exposition when discussing 
sectoral estimation results. 
SEC NACE Rev.2 codes Sector description (based on NACE 2 classification) Label 
1 A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1_AGRI 
2 B Mining and quarrying 2_MING 
3 10-12 Food products, beverages and tobacco 3_FOOD 
4 13-15 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products 4_TXTL 
5 16-18 Wood and paper products; printing and reproduction of recorded media 5_WOOD 
6 19 Coke and refined petroleum products 6_COKE 
7 20-21 Chemicals and chemical products 7_CHEM 
8 22-23 Rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products 8_RUBB 
9 24-25 Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment  9_METL 
10 26-27 Electrical and optical equipment  10_ELEC 
11 28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 11_MACH 
12 29-30 Transport equipment  12_TRAN 
13 31-33 Other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment  13_OMAN 
14 D-E Electricity, gas and water supply 14_GASW 
15 F Construction 15_CONS 
16 45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 16_TRMO 
17 46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 17_WHTR 
18 47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 18_RETR 
19 49-52 Transport and storage 19_TRSR 
20 53 Postal and courier activities 20_POST  
21 I Accommodation and food service activities 21_ACCO 
22 J Information and communication 22_INFO 
23 K Financial and insurance activities 23_FINA 
24 L Real estate activities 24_REAL 
25 M-N 
Professional, scientific, technical, administrative and support service 
activities 
25_PROF 
26 O-U Community social and personal services 26_SOCI 
100 TOT Country total 100_TOTL 
Source: own elaboration 
The data for capital stocks, their composition by asset types, labour productivity, hours 
worked and labour composition variables are obtained from the new EU KLEMS 2019 
Release (see Adarov and Stehrer, 2019a for additional details on the database). The new EU 
KLEMS release, besides additional time coverage, introduces an expanded capital asset type 
classification. First, it includes the ten asset types available from national accounts capital 
data, which have already been included in previous EU KLEMS editions (the taxonomy is 
presented in the Appendix Figure A1): Cultivated assets (Cult), Dwellings (RStruc), Other 
buildings and structures (OCon), Transport equipment (TraEq), Other machinery equipment 
(OMach), Computer hardware (IT), Telecommunications equipment (CT), Computer software 
and databases (SoftDB), Research and development (RD), Other intellectual property 
products (OIPP). Second, the database introduces four new ‘supplementary’ intangible asset 
types, including Advertising and Market Research (AdvMRes), Design (Design), Purchased 
Organisational Capital (POCap) and Vocational Training (VT). 
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Tangible assets Intangible assets 
 
Figure 2.1. Capital asset aggregates 
  
 
Note: Dashed lines indicate asset types outside the boundaries of National Accounts. 
Source: own elaboration based on Haskel and Westlake (2018).  
 
Therefore, we distinguish fourteen capital asset types. In order to make the list of asset types 
more manageable and focused on the role of tangibles/intangibles and ICT/non-ICT capital, as 
well as to gain efficiency in the estimations given the relatively small sample size, the 
baseline econometric analysis follows Haskel and Westlake (2018) and groups the 14 asset 
types into 6 broader aggregates, as outlined in Figure 2.1. 
 
The data for GDP, institutional development and educational attainment are obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators and Penn World Tables 9.1. In some empirical 
exercises we also employ measures for backward and forward global value chain participation 
(GVC participation), which are computed following the approach of Koopman et al. (2014), 
using the WIOD database (for additional technical details see Adarov and Stehrer, 2019b). 
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3 Productivity, capital and GVC dynamics: review of recent 
trends 
This section reviews recent trends in productivity, capital and GVC integration. Key 
takeaways regarding productivity dynamics are as follows: First, productivity growth has 
been slowing on a global scale between 2000 and 2017, although comparatively less in the US 
than in Europe. This slowdown is more pronounced after the 2007/2008 recession. Second, 
EU countries with lower absolute levels of productivity tend to have higher growth rates, 
suggesting a certain degree of convergence between EU countries. Despite this trend, there 
are still substantial gaps in absolute productivity levels and some countries stay behind 
comparable EU economies regarding both absolute levels and growth of productivity 
(Croatia, Greece, Portugal and to a lesser extent Italy and Spain). Third, a majority of EU 
countries exhibits lower levels of productivity as well as productivity growth than the US 
(and, in many cases, also Japan), with the only exceptions being Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France and Germany.  
 
Given these trends, analysing the drivers of productivity has been high on the agenda of both 
economists and policy makers. Prior to an econometric analysis focusing on productivity 
drivers, in this section, we also describe the most important trends regarding the key 
conjectured drivers of productivity, including capital dynamics and its composition, GVC 
participation and FDI. 
 
With respect to the latter, European countries show much higher levels of FDI as a percentage 
of GDP compared with non-EU peer economies, but there also is significant within-EU 
heterogeneity. When looking at aggregate capital intensity, there are large differences 
between countries and EU countries generally lag behind Japan and the US. Zooming in on 
the composition of the capital stock demonstrates that most of the capital stock value (90%) is 
in non-ICT capital, with the only outlier being Japan, with particularly high shares of ICT and 
Software. While there have been only marginal changes in the shares of ICT and Software in 
total capital, there has been a notable increase in the employment intensities of these types of 
capital (i.e. the stock of real capital per person employed). 
 
3.1 Productivity dynamics in Europe: a comparative perspective 
 
This section reviews the labour productivity dynamics in Europe over time and relative to 
peer economies. As a measure of labour productivity we use real value added per hour 
worked (at the annual frequency), which better reflects the productivity concept in comparison 
with the alternative measure of labour productivity per person employed, as it is not prone to 
the bias associated with the full-time versus part-time workers.  
 
Sluggish productivity growth has been a major challenge for many economies worldwide, 
particularly in the post-crisis period. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, most European countries 
suffered a major slowdown in labour productivity growth in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession, followed by a double-dip recession. This dynamic did not improve in the post-
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2013 period either, but, quite on the contrary, in most countries, the slowdown persisted and 
productivity is still hardly seen on the recovery path. With the exception of Ireland, Spain, 
Italy and Denmark, labour productivity growth has further decelerated in the post-crisis 
period. Especially strong productivity slowdowns were incurred by the Baltic countries and 
Romania, where the average productivity growth declined by more than 3 percentage points 
after the crisis. 
 
Figure 3.1. Productivity dynamics 
Note: The figure shows real labour productivity (per hour worked) growth and real labour productivity level (in mn 2010 
USD). The figures indicate 2000-2017 averages along with the pre-crisis and post-crisis period averages (with and without 
the double-dip recession period). Countries are sorted by ISO3 in alphabetic order. EU28 indicates EU-28 average values. 
Labour productivity growth, year-on-year % change  
 
Labour productivity level (th 2010 USD) 
 
 
Source: own computations based on EU KLEMS 2019. 
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While the recent years were characterised by particularly lasting and sizeable productivity 
losses, it should also be noted that the productivity slowdown is not a phenomenon observed 
in the recent post-crisis years only; rather, many countries of Europe, both advanced and 
developing, suffered from productivity decelerations also in the pre-crisis period.  
 
In case of the EU, productivity dynamics are also driven by economic convergence processes 
related to the EU enlargement process, as countries with lower absolute productivity levels 
generally tend to enjoy a faster productivity growth rates relative to high-productivity 
economies (Figure 3.2). This has been a particularly important factor for Europe as multi-
speed EU integration facilitates institutional and infrastructural upgrading of the countries 
lagging behind — the transition economies and the Western Balkan countries. At the same 
time, a group of countries (often referred to as Mediterranean countries) comprising Portugal, 
Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, and, to a lesser extent, Italy and Spain, still lag behind comparable 
peer economies. These countries exhibit lower productivity growth than expected based on 
the general statistical association between the productivity levels and productivity growth 
rates as can be inferred from the scatterplot in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2. Long-run productivity convergence 
Note: The figure shows the scatterplot of long-run labour productivity levels and growth rates along with the fitted linear 
regression line. EU28 indicates the EU sample average.  
 
Source: own calculations based on EU KLEMS 2019. 
 
While most EU countries tend to lag behind the US, a few of them are at or near the global 
‘productivity frontier’ — Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Denmark. These countries are 
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also characterised by lower productivity growth rates as it is a general pattern that high-
productivity countries have lower productivity growth rates.5 
 
With the exception of selected high-performance economies, many EU countries lag behind 
the USA in terms of aggregate labour productivity, and in many cases are also behind the 
productivity levels of Japan. US labour productivity levels are in fact almost twice the EU 
average, and this is the case both before and after the recent crisis (see Figure 3.1). The EU 
suffered a major setback in productivity growth rates as a result of the crisis and, although it 
exhibits a productivity growth rate moderately above that of the USA in the post-crisis period, 
bridging this gap appears to be an uphill battle. 
 
A comparative overview of sectoral labour productivity dynamics is reported in Adarov and 
Stehrer (2020, Figure 2.2.5.) for each of the 26 sectors outlined in Section 2 (real labour 
productivity growth rates in those sectors are also reported in Figure A3 in the Appendix). 
The sectoral labour productivity dynamics reveal a similar pattern, with most EU countries 
lagging behind the USA with the exception of selected frontier economies — mainly Austria, 
Germany, Finland, Belgium, Denmark (the relative standing of countries differs across 
sectors, however). Inter alia, the productivity gap is particularly pronounced in the high-tech 
manufacturing cluster (sectors 10_ELEC, 11_MACH, 12_TRAN). Both Japan and the USA 
significantly surpass average EU productivity in these sectors with the gap widening in the 
post-crisis period. In the post-crisis period, the EU suffered from a significant slowdown in 
the productivity growth dynamics in these sectors, especially in 10_ELEC and 11_MACH 
sectors which previously were the motor of productivity growth in the EU (see Figure 3.3 for 
a comparative review of the average EU productivity by sectors before and after the crisis). 
As productivity growth is slowing across multiple sectors, it appears that the decline in 
aggregate national productivity is associated to a greater extent with common nation-wide 
structural and cyclical challenges, rather than with a structural shift of the economy of 
European countries towards sectors with lower productivity growth rates (although the latter 
might still contribute to some extent). 
  
                                              
5 We do not include Ireland in the sample as the country is an outlier in terms of its tax regime, FDI flows and productivity. It  
is however worth mentioning that among the European countries and globally, Ireland has demonstrated an especially high 
level of labour productivity coupled with high productivity growth rates, which also proved to be resilient to the post -crisis 
growth malaise. Its particularly high productivity level is attributed to the heavy presence of multinational corporations in the 
economy (particularly, pharmaceuticals, ICT and food sectors -- see the Irish National Competitiveness Council, 2019). 
Notably, while the multinational companies in Ireland are highly productive, the productivity of domestic enterprises is much 
lower (also below the OECD average). 
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Figure 3.3 Labour productivity by sectors: EU-28 average before and after crisis 
Note: The figure shows real labour productivity growth rates (%) before and after the crisis (the period 2000-2006 and 2007 -
2017, respectively) along with the 45-degree line. Sector 6_COKE is omitted (outlier, see Appendix Figure A2 for its values). 
 
Source: own computations based on EU KLEMS 2019. 
 
3.2. FDI and capital dynamics 
As discussed in the data section, our analysis employs the FDI data compiled using the 
Eurostat and OECD datasets netting out investment associated with SPEs. We also exclude 
countries that are commonly acknowledged by experts as low-tax countries (Hines, 2010). 
This allows focussing on the real economic implications pertinent to FDI, in the sense of 
conveying a lasting interest by an investor in one economy in having an enterprise resident in 
another economy. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the dynamics of FDI for the EU in comparison with the global FDI intensity 
and selected economies. The EU is characterised by a much higher FDI intensity relative to its 
peer economies — the USA, China, Japan, South Korea – in terms of both inward and 
outward FDI-to-GDP ratios. Despite a decline in the volume of FDI in the EU relative to 2017 
(inward FDI stock decreased by 0.2% and outward FDI stock by 5.3%), FDI intensity in 2018 
stands high at 54.8 percent of GDP for inward FDI stock and 60.3 percent of GDP in the case 
of outward FDI stock. Overall, the post-crisis period has been characterised by a decline in 
FDI inflows for European countries (Figure 3.5, top panel). 
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While aggregate capital intensities vary significantly across European countries (Figure 3.5, 
bottom panel), in terms of the absolute levels of real capital stock and capital-to-labour ratios 
European countries generally lag behind the peers (e.g. USA and Japan).  
 
Figure 3.4 Inward and outward FDI stocks, 2014-2018 average 
Note: the figure shows 2014-2018 average inward and outward FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP for the EU, the world 
economy (WLD) and selected economies. 2014-2017 average for South Korea. 
 
Source: own computations based on the OECD FDI database, 2019 
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Figure 3.5 FDI and capital accumulation before and after the Great Recession 
Note: The figure shows inward FDI stocks and real capital stocks. Numbers are given as 2000-2017 averages along wit h  t h e 
pre-crisis and post-crisis period averages (with and without the double-dip recession period). Countries are sorted by ISO3  in  
alphabetic order.  
 
Inward FDI stock, share of GDP (ex. low-tax countries) 
 
Real capital stock, thousand USD per person employed 
 
 
 
Source: own computations based on EU KLEMS 2019, Eurostat and OECD data 
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Of equal importance is the composition of capital stocks, in particular, the share of ICT 
capital and intangible assets, which recently have come to be seen as important new factors of 
economic growth and productivity. Based on the capital asset taxonomy introduced in Section 
2, in Figure 3.6 we present the share of individual capital asset aggregates in total capital 
stocks, also examining the changes between the pre- and post-crisis periods (for the countries 
for which the detailed capital asset composition is available in the EU KLEMS 2019).  
 
Most of the capital stock value (about 90%) is attributed nonICT capital. In this regard, Japan 
prominently stands out from the rest of the sample with a smaller share of nonICT capital and 
particularly high shares of ICT, SoftDB and RD capital in the total capital stock; however, as 
a share of employment these capital asset aggregates are in line with other countries. 
European countries exhibit significant heterogeneity in terms of capital composition. While 
no significant changes are observed in the shares of tangible and intangible ICT capital in 
total capital stocks (there is a marginal increase in share of SoftDB along with a slight 
decrease in the share of tangible ICT in total capital stock), their per-person-employed 
intensities have increased notably despite the decline in the real capital stock growth (see Fig. 
C.1 in Appendix C). Among the European countries, Austria, Sweden and Denmark appear to 
be the leaders at the digital capital frontier as measured by the importance of ICT and SoftDB 
relative to both total capital stock and the persons employed (France is also included in this 
group for SoftDB, but not for tangible ICT). 
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Figure 3.6 Composition of capital stocks by asset groups 
Note: The figure shows the share of an asset group in the total capital stock, averages over the period 2000 -2006 and 2010-
2016. Countries are listed by ISO3 in alphabetic order. 
  
  
  
Source: own computations based on EU KLEMS 2019 
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3.3 GVC integration  
 
Based on the WIOD 2016 release (the most recent WIOD vintage to date, see Timmer et al., 
2013, 2014) we compute GVC participation at an aggregate national and at sectoral levels, 
following the framework of Koopman et al. (2014) and identify forward and backward 
linkages in gross exports (see Adarov and Stehrer, 2020 for additional details). 
 
Backward GVC participation is measured as the share of the imported value added from 
foreign suppliers upstream in the country’s gross exports. Forward GVC participation is 
measured as the domestic value added entering the exports of other countries. A combination 
of backward and forward integration yields a measure of a country’s total GVC participation.  
 
Figure 3.7 Backward and forward GVC participation  
Note: the figure shows the scatterplot of backward GVC participation against forward GVC participat ion (excluding low-tax 
countries) for the period 2000-2014. Non-EU countries are marked in red.  The data for 2014 is labelled. 
 
Source: own elaboration based on WIOD 2016 release 
 
Observing the international production sharing patterns within Europe (Figure 3.7), it appears 
that countries tend to “specialize” in either backward or forward linkages. Over time, most 
countries have been moving in the direction of increasing both backward and forward 
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linkages, and therefore the perceived negative relationship between GVCct
BWI and GVCct
FWI does 
not actually imply a trade-off between joining upstream or downstream production processes.6 
 
Comparing Europe with selected peer economies – China, Japan, South Korea and the USA – 
suggests that European countries generally have a higher degree of GVC integration (see 
Figure 3.7). One notable exception is the USA, which has a higher degree of forward GVC 
participation than all analysed countries and, at the same time, the lowest degree of backward 
GVC participation. In this respect, it is on the other end of the GVC spectrum in comparison 
with Hungary, which, on the contrary, has the highest level of backward GVC integration, 
while its forward GVC participation is among the lowest in the sample. European countries 
also exhibit higher levels of GVC integration than China and Japan, both upstream and 
downstream.7 
 
The relative GVC position of countries is rather stable and does not change dramatically 
relative to other countries (Adarov and Stehrer, 2019b). While countries did drift gradually 
over the observed period 2000-2014 in the GVC “space” spanning backward and forward 
GVC integration, relative to other countries they tend to remain localized in a certain area.  
 
  
                                              
6
 Looking at the sectoral variation of value chain integration also yields interesting insights, but goes beyond the scope of t his 
article. A detailed analysis also accounting for sectoral variation can be found in Adarov and Stehrer (2019b). For such an 
analysis, GVC participation measures are based on sectoral output instead of value added. 
7
 Regarding GVC integration by sector, Adarov and Stehrer (2019b) show that European countries tend to be better embedded 
in global value chains both in terms of upstream and downstream integration in the manufacturing sectors. Only in Electronic 
equipment manufacturing, Japan, South Korea and the USA exhibit average forward GVC participation at relatively high levels 
(above 0.07), which is however sti l l significantly lower than the forward GVC participation by frontier European countries (e.g., 
forward GVC participation of Austria, Lithuania and Romania exceeds 0.14).  
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4. The drivers of productivity: Econometric analysis 
In this section, we use panel data techniques to examine the impact of capital accumulation 
and structure on productivity at aggregate country and sectoral levels, controlling for the 
impact of other relevant factors, including global value chain participation and economic 
integration.  The model setup is briefly described in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we focus on 
the impact of different types of capital assets (including FDI) on productivity growth. Section 
4.3 analyses other potential drivers of productivity, such GVC integration and EU integration, 
and also controls for FDI and alternative FDI measures. In Section 4.4, instead of using sector 
aggregates, we look at individual sectors and sector groups to check for possible aggregation 
biases. Finally, in Section 4.5, we use the econometric results from previous sections to 
estimate by how much labour productivity in the EU would increase for different 
ICT/Software investment policies. 
 
4.1. Model setup 
 
Based on a standard production function explaining output as a function of capital and labour 
inputs, as well as total factor productivity, we use the following specification as the baseline 
model: 
 
ΔlnPRODct =  α1 lnPRODct−1 + α2 lnLct + ∑ β𝑞
q∈Q
ΔlnKqct  + σΔlnFDIct−1 + 𝛏𝐗 𝐜𝐭  + 𝛍 + εct 
where ΔlnPRODct is the measure of productivity in country c (real value added per hour 
worked), in log-differenced form (thus conveying its growth rate). The term lnPRODct−1 is 
the lagged level of real labour productivity capturing the convergence effect. ΔlnLct is the 
labour input: the growth of the labour services, which is used for baseline estimations, or a 
combination of the hours worked and the change in the labour composition, i.e. ∆ ln Lct =
∆ ln LCct + ∆ ln Hct. 
 
The term ΔlnKqct denotes the measure of capital inputs. The baseline model uses real capital 
stocks in log-differences distinguishing between several capital asset types (alternative 
specifications include capital services growth and the change in real capital stocks as a share 
of employed persons). In the baseline analysis we distinguish the six broader capital asset 
groups as defined in Section 2, i.e. the set Q = {SoftDB; NonICT; ICT; RD; OInnProp; 
EconComp}. As a robustness check, we also analyse the fourteen detailed capital asset types 
instead of the aggregate groups. 
 
The variable ΔlnFDIct−1 denotes a measure of foreign direct investment; the baseline model 
employs inward FDI growth (real inward FDI stock in log-differences8), alternative 
specifications use the change in the inward FDI stock as a share of GDP and the ratio of (real) 
                                              
8 GDP deflators are used to compute FDI in constant prices.  
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inward FDI stock to the persons employed in log-differences. In order to address possible 
endogeneity issues the FDI variable is lagged by one or more years. 
 
In additional empirical exercises the model is further augmented by other explanatory 
variables of interest 𝐗𝐜𝐭, including interaction terms of FDI with various variables conveying 
‘absorptive capacity’: institutional variables (World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators measuring government effectiveness and control of corruption), educational 
attainment, quality of infrastructure, financial development measured as private credit-to-GDP 
ratio and others. Further estimations also incorporate GVC participation measures and EU 
integration variables — discussed in more detail in Section 4.3. Finally, 𝝁 denotes the vector 
of country (time-invariant) and year fixed effects, capturing unobserved country heterogeneity 
and common year-specific shocks. 
 
4.2. The impact of digital capital and other capital asset types 
 
In this section, we assess the effects of different capital asset types and FDI on labour 
productivity (all variables are given in log-differences). The model is estimated first via fixed 
effects with standard errors clustered by country (“FE”) as the baseline estimator — the 
results are reported in Table 4.1 with the baseline specification listed in column 1. We also 
report pooled OLS (“POLS”) and the Arellano-Bover / Blundell-Bond system GMM 
(“System GMM”) estimates for comparison. The results are consistent across all 
specifications and estimators in terms of statistical significance and magnitudes. 
 
Although we remove the effects of SPEs from the FDI data and drop low-tax countries (see  
Section 2), the panel dataset still suffers from outliers associated with some countries (the 
issue is worse for the sector-level analysis) that may bias the results. The main results are thus 
based on the threshold of 2 standard deviations from the mean imposed on the key variables 
of interest (labour productivity growth, growth of real capital stock by asset types and growth 
of real FDI stock). This allows to focus on the robust average marginal effects (effectively, 
based on 87-90% of the data).9  
 
The analysis strongly suggests that higher investment in ICT capital is associated with an 
increase in labour productivity growth, consistent with the idea that advanced technology 
embodied in ICT effectively complements workers’ skills leading to productive efficiency 
gains. More generally, ICT capital, being a general-purpose technology, has multiple channels 
through which it may influence broad-based productivity at the country level, including faster 
and more efficient communication, better data management practices and enhanced data flow, 
thereby also reducing information inefficiencies and fostering knowledge creation and 
transfer. Notably, both tangible ICT (ICT) and intangible ICT (SoftDB) variables are 
statistically significant and imply sizeable economic effects: a 1-pp increase in the growth of 
                                              
9
 The use of the cut-off thresholds to control for outliers was motivated by a series of additional specification tests, including 
partial-regression leverage plots, added-variable plots and the Cook’s distance measures. Estimation results with alternative 
outlier thresholds, along with the estimates without any outlier control, are reported in the Appendix in Table B3 accompanied by 
Table B4 which contains related summary statistics for each exercise. 
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real capital stock induces an increase in real labour productivity growth of about 0.06 pp in 
the case of the tangible ICT capital and 0.09 pp in the case of the intangible SoftDB capital. In 
fact, the impact of SoftDB is more profound relative to the ICT aggregate in terms of the 
magnitude and manifests itself more strongly across multiple specification and robustness 
checks, including alternative samples and models.10 
 
Contrary to our expectations, we do not find an impact of FDI growth on productivity growth. 
In fact, neither does an effect manifest at deeper lags of the FDI variable, nor after adjusting 
for each country’s absorption capacity as proxied by institutional development, human capital 
and financial development measures. This implies that, after imposing a strict control over the 
sample, that is, removing the impact of strong outliers like Ireland, removing the bias 
associated with SPEs and controlling for other factors, the role of FDI as a booster of labour 
productivity may not be significant at least in the relatively short time spans of several years. 
This is however consistent with the idea that in the present case FDI is targeting countries (or 
sectors) with already high levels of productivity, and thus does not necessarily contribute to 
further productivity growth at aggregate country levels. 
 
The variable lagged labour productivity level is negative and significant throughout 
specifications, indicating strong convergence effects as countries with lower productivity 
levels generally exhibit faster productivity growth. Introducing deeper lags of the real labour 
productivity variable as a robustness check yields very similar results (available upon 
request). The growth of labour services is overwhelmingly associated with a declining rate of 
labour productivity. The decomposition of labour services into its components – the hours 
worked and the labour composition (Column 2) – reveals that this effect is entirely 
attributable to the negative impact of the growth in the hours worked, which confirms the 
conjecture of diminishing marginal returns to labour inputs. 
  
                                              
10
 We also included an interaction term between SoftDB and ICT capital to account for possible mutually reinforcing effects. The 
interaction term however does not enter statistically significantly and also does not change the results qualitatively (the results 
are available on request). Further, we additionally estimate the model using the fourteen detailed capital asset types, which 
confirms our baseline results and otherwise does not yield additional insights (results available upon request). 
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Table 4.1. Aggregate country-level estimation results 
Note: The table shows the estimation results using fixed effects (‘FE’) with standard errors clustered by country (in parentheses), as well as 
pooled OLS (‘POLS’) and system GMM (‘GMM’) based on 3-year non-c averages. The dependent variable is Δln (labour productivity). *,  **,  
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. The GMM  model is reported merely for reference as it is based 
on 3-year non-overlapping averages, which ensures that N > T (in this case N=20 and T=6), which significantly reduces the sample size.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  FE FE FE FE FE POLS GMM 
        ln (Labour productivity), lag -0.122*** -0.119*** 
 
-0.135*** -0.106*** -0.010*** -0.117** 
 
(0.021) (0.019) 
 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.002) (0.047) 
Δln (Labour services) -0.333*** 
 
-0.397*** -0.327*** -0.356*** -0.325*** -0.282* 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.079) (0.079) (0.068) (0.059) (0.166) 
Labour composition growth 
 
-0.028 
     
  
(0.151) 
     Δln (Hours worked) 
 
-0.378*** 
     
  
(0.072) 
     Δln (Inward FDI stock), lag -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 
 
-0.004 -0.011 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
(0.007) (0.035) 
ΔLn (EconComp, real capital stock) -0.039* -0.031 -0.040 
 
-0.029 -0.012 -0.099 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.024) 
 
(0.020) (0.025) (0.073) 
ΔLn (ICT, real capital stock) 0.055** 0.061*** 0.045** 
 
0.040** 0.031** 0.030 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.059) 
ΔLn (NonICT, real capital stock) -0.037 0.018 -0.063 
 
-0.006 -0.002 0.119 
 
(0.122) (0.103) (0.120) 
 
(0.114) (0.096) (0.323) 
ΔLn (OInnProp, real capital stock) -0.002 -0.003 -0.021 
 
0.013 0.008 0.026 
 
(0.050) (0.047) (0.054) 
 
(0.049) (0.054) (0.098) 
ΔLn (RD, real capital stock) 0.046 0.041 0.057 
 
0.041 0.020 0.014 
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.044) 
 
(0.033) (0.035) (0.084) 
ΔLn (SoftDB, real capital stock) 0.085** 0.085*** 0.091** 
 
0.083*** 0.091** 0.105* 
 
(0.031) (0.029) (0.035) 
 
(0.027) (0.036) (0.060) 
ΔLn (Labour productivity), lag 
      
-0.043 
       
(0.185) 
   
        
        
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        Observations 216 216 216 248 262 216 76 
Adj. R-squared 0.581 0.593 0.521 0.495 0.589 0.468   
 
 
We also run estimations separately for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, as well as the full 
period, excluding the crisis years (for the purpose of the analysis the crisis years are defined 
as the period of 2007-2009, which covers the periods of real economic growth decline and 
post-crisis recovery). The results are reported in Table 4.2. The exclusion of the crisis years 
has virtually no effect on the estimates. At the same time, examining separately the pre-crisis 
and the post-crisis periods, while the tangible ICT capital variable does not result statistically 
significant in both periods, the impact of intangible ICT (SoftDB) remains significant, albeit 
with a somewhat lower coefficient before than after the crisis (0.06 vs. 0.11). One should 
however note that the number of observations available for the pre-crisis period is not high 
(59) and thus the results are less robust. 
 
  
 
26 
 
Table 4.2. Pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods 
Note: The table shows the estimation results using fixed effects with standard errors clustered by country (in parentheses). The dependent 
variable is Δln (labour productivity). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.  Baseline specification i s  
estimated for the full sample including all years, i.e. 2000-2017 (column 1), the period 2000-2006 (pre-crisis), the period 2010-2017 (post-
crisis) and the full sample excluding the crisis years, including the post-crisis recovery period (2007-2009). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  all years pre-crisis post-crisis all years, excl. crisis 
          
Ln (Labour productivity), lag -0.122*** -0.082 -0.198*** -0.112*** 
 
(0.021) (0.092) (0.056) (0.021) 
ΔLn (Labour services) -0.333*** -0.433** -0.354*** -0.338*** 
 
(0.073) (0.176) (0.115) (0.078) 
ΔLn (EconComp, real capital stock) -0.039* -0.064 -0.031 -0.082** 
 
(0.020) (0.088) (0.034) (0.034) 
ΔLn (ICT, real capital stock) 0.055** 0.004 0.073 0.058*** 
 
(0.021) (0.015) (0.043) (0.020) 
ΔLn (NonICT, real capital stock) -0.037 0.108 0.107 -0.108 
 
(0.122) (0.155) (0.165) (0.107) 
ΔLn (OInnProp, real capital stock) -0.002 -0.084 -0.073 0.002 
 
(0.050) (0.150) (0.061) (0.060) 
ΔLn (RD, real capital stock) 0.046 0.030 -0.018 0.018 
 
(0.039) (0.094) (0.040) (0.034) 
ΔLn (SoftDB, real capital stock) 0.085** 0.108* 0.060** 0.098*** 
 
(0.031) (0.057) (0.024) (0.025) 
ΔLn (Inward FDI stock), lag -0.012 -0.010 0.003 -0.008 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
     Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 59 117 176 
Adj. R-squared 0.581 0.368 0.594 0.574 
 
 
4.3. Further inquiry into the integration effects 
 
In this section, we present additional results focusing on the effects of GVC participation, 
European economic integration, as well on the implications of FDI for labour productivity, 
given that the baseline estimation results did not reveal any significant impact, somewhat 
contrary to standard intuition. The results are reported in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3. The impact of GVC participation and EU membership 
Note: The table shows the estimation results using fixed effects with standard errors clustered by country (in parentheses). The dependent 
variable is Δln (labour productivity). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. ‘FDI’ in the int eract ion 
terms refers to real inward FDI stock in log-differences, i.e. Δln (Inward FDI stock). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
Ln (Labour productivity), lag -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.129*** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.148*** -0.148*** 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) 
ΔLn (Labour services) -0.339*** -0.339*** -0.336*** -0.347*** -0.334*** -0.342*** -0.342*** 
 
(0.076) (0.075) (0.080) (0.075) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) 
ΔLn (EconComp, real capital stock) -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.044 -0.039* -0.027 -0.027 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
ΔLn (ICT, real capital stock) 0.043** 0.043** 0.043** 0.039* 0.055** 0.060** 0.060** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
ΔLn (NonICT, real capital stock) 0.036 0.036 0.015 0.048 -0.034 -0.050 -0.050 
 
(0.131) (0.131) (0.128) (0.123) (0.124) (0.126) (0.126) 
ΔLn (OInnProp, real capital stock) -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
ΔLn (RD, real capital stock) 0.056 0.056 0.054 0.053 0.046 0.036 0.036 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) 
ΔLn (SoftDB, real capital stock) 0.075** 0.075** 0.082** 0.070** 0.085** 0.081** 0.081** 
 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) 
FDI = ΔLn (Inward FDI stock), lag -0.014* -0.014* -0.013 -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Δ Backward GVC, lag 0.200** 0.204** 
 
0.237** 
   
 
(0.085) (0.076) 
 
(0.091) 
   Δ Forward GVC, lag -0.017 
 
-0.139 -0.108 
   
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.146) (0.179) 
   FDI × Δ Backward GVC , lag 
   
-0.083 
   
    
(0.461) 
   FDI × Δ Forward GVC, lag 
   
1.664 
   
    
(1.001) 
   FDI × Transition economy DV, lag 
    
0.003 
  
     
(0.016) 
  EU membership DV 
     
0.015** 0.015** 
      
(0.006) (0.006) 
Years in the EU 
      
0.006* 
       
(0.003) 
 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 193 193 193 193 216 216 216 
Adj. R-squared 0.601 0.603 0.594 0.604 0.579 0.585 0.585 
 
Across all specifications, the marginal effect of ICT and SoftDB remains significant. We first 
examine the impact of backward and forward GVC participation on productivity. While 
forward GVC integration does not reveal any impact, backward GVC participation enters 
significantly with the marginal impact of 0.2, which implies that an increase in backward 
GVC participation by 0.1 induces a 2 pp increase in the growth of aggregate labour 
productivity.11 It is intuitive that participation in global value chains provides an opportunity 
for productivity gains due to knowledge spillovers from MNEs and efficiency gains 
associated with greater specialisation in certain tasks. In this respect, the results highlight the 
important difference in the relative gains associated with the mode of GVC participation: in 
the case of specialisation in relatively more downstream industries, as measured by backward 
GVC participation, firms are able to take advantage of imported inputs of superior quality 
and/or lower costs, and, in general, greater available variety of foreign inputs. 
 
We perform a range of additional empirical exercises with alternative FDI measures, as well 
as interaction terms (available upon request). However, FDI effects do not manifest 
themselves at statistically significant levels, consistent with the baseline results. 
                                              
11 For reference, the backward GVC participation indicator by construction takes on values only in the 0-1 interval; the sample year-on-year 
change in the backward GVC participation varies from -0.05 to +0.04 with a mean of 0.005. 
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Finally, we augment the model with an EU dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
country is an EU member and, additionally, the number of years in the EU is introduced to 
gauge possible non-linear effects associated with the intensity of integration.12 Notably, both 
variables are statistically significant, implying that the EU membership boosts labour 
productivity growth by 1.5 pp, with each year in the bloc bringing an additional increase of 
0.6 pp, ceteris paribus, that is in addition to the general convergence effects. Proxying EU 
integration only by a dummy variable and by the number of years in the EU is of course a 
crude measure and therefore these results have to be interpreted cautiously. 
 
4.4. Sectoral analysis 
 
In order to address the possible aggregation bias and investigate heterogeneous effects of 
digital capital and other variables of interest across sectors, we also perform separate 
estimations for each of the twenty-five sectors13 as outlined in Section 2, as well as pooled 
estimations with the primary, manufacturing and services sector groups. 
 
For the sector-specific analysis, we use a specification similar to the baseline aggregate 
country-level model: 
 
ΔlnPRODcjt =  α1 lnPRODcjt−1 + α2 lnLcjt +  ∑ β𝑞
q∈Q
ΔlnKqcjt  + σΔlnFDIcjt−1 + 𝛏𝐗 𝐜𝐣𝐭  + 𝛍 + εcjt 
Here, j denotes the economic sector.  For the pooled estimations with sector groups, as well as 
the all-sector pooled sample, the model is estimated with several alternative vectors of fixed 
effects for robustness, including country-sector and year effects, country-sector and sector-
year fixed effects, country-sector and country-year fixed effects. In pooled sectoral 
estimations standard errors are clustered at the country-sector level. 
 
Similarly to the aggregate country-level regression analysis, in the baseline analysis we drop 
observations that are outside of the two-standard deviation interval from the sector-specific 
sample mean for the main variables of interest (labour productivity, FDI and capital growth 
rates) as the marginal impact of outlier values would be even greater at the sectoral level. 
 
We first run individual estimations for each sector in the analysis using the baseline fixed 
effects model regressing real labour productivity growth on real inward FDI stock growth 
lagged by one year, real capital stock growth (by capital asset aggregates) and control 
variables as described in the previous subsection. 
 
The marginal effects for each capital asset aggregate and the FDI variable are reported in 
Figure D.1 in Appendix D. In addition, the 99% and 90% confidence intervals computed from 
the robust standard errors are plotted along with the marginal effects to gauge both the 
                                              
12 To this end we use the year of entry of each country starting from the Treaties of Rome (i.e. the year 1958) as listed by the European 
Commission on the EU portal: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en#tab-0-1. 
13
 Sector 20_POST lacks sufficient capital asset data and is therefore omitted in the sectoral analysis. 
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statistical and the economic significance of the estimates. The corresponding regression 
results are reported in Table 4.4. 
 
In the following, we group our findings by independent variable and discuss in which sector it 
is significant, starting with different capital assets (tangible and intangible ICT, R&D, FDI 
and aggregate capital) and then discussing other independent variables and model variations. 
 
Regarding ICT capital, the positive impact of tangible ICT capital accumulation (labelled 
"ICT") is found for sectors 3_FOOD and 12_TRAN. Among the services sectors, the 
significant effect (although only at the 10% level) is found for the sector 22_INFO, which is 
in line with expectations as the provision of information and communication services heavily 
relies on tangible and intangible ICT capital. In all three cases, the magnitude of the effect is 
about 0.1. At the same time, notably, the impact of intangible ICT capital ("SoftDB") is more 
pronounced, with especially strong positive effects in terms of both statistical and economic 
significance observed in sectors 4_TXTL, 16_TRMO and 6_COKE. In the latter case, the 
magnitude is particularly high, implying almost a one-to-one increase in labour productivity 
growth associated with the growth in SoftDB capital. SoftDB capital also enters positively for 
the sector 11_MACH, but the effect is less significant statistically and in terms of economic 
significance (the estimate varies in the range of 0.08-0.1 across specifications). Surprisingly, 
intangible ICT also has a negative impact on sector 5_WOOD. Overall, the results observed 
across all specifications do not reveal strong systematic patterns across sectoral groups; while 
the high-tech sectors and sectors involved in the provision of information and communication 
services tend to exhibit more consistent positive response of productivity growth to ICT and 
RD capital, the impact of capital composition varies significantly and is specific to each 
sector. 
 
RD capital, besides the mining sector 2_MING, is found to be conducive to labour 
productivity growth in technologically advanced manufacturing and services sectors: 
11_MACH, 13_OMAN, 22_INFO and 25_PROF. The results are particularly noteworthy for 
sectors 11_MACH and 25_PROF, which are characterised by relatively high average intensity 
of RD capital in total capital stock of the sector.14 
 
We generally do not find a strong impact of inward FDI on labour productivity. The positive 
effects manifest themselves only for some sectors at deeper lags. At the 1-year lag, the weakly 
statistically significant — at the 10-percent level of statistical significance — impact of FDI is 
observed only for sector 1_AGRI (positive effect), and for sectors 10_ELEC and 15_CONS 
(negative effects). Estimations with alternative FDI measures yield similar results (available 
upon request).  
 
By contrast, the impact of capital accumulation on labour productivity is much more 
profound, although the impact varies significantly across sectors and capital asset types. 
Examining first the impacts of non-ICT capital asset types, notably, in the case of the primary 
                                              
14
 More generally, the RD-capital intensive sectors with the average share of RD capital in total capital stock of at least 10% are the high-
tech manufacturing sectors involved in the production of machinery and electronics (SEC10, SEC11, SEC 12) and chemical/pharmaceutical 
products (7_CHEM), as well as SEC25 (professional services).  See Table A2 in the Appendix for a review of capital composition by sectors.  
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sectors, 1_AGRI and 2_MING, investment in EconComp facilitates labour productivity with 
the estimated magnitude of about 0.3 (a 1-pp increase in the growth of capital stock induces 
an 0.3-pp increase in productivity growth), statistically significant at the 5-10% level.15 For a 
number of manufacturing and services sectors, the impact of EconComp however is negative 
with magnitudes in the 0.2-0.3 range (especially for sectors 3_FOOD and 13_OMAN, as well 
as 7_CHEM and 24_REAL). NonICT capital enters significantly with a positive sign for 
13_OMAN, 15_CONS and 25_PROF sectors. 
 
Summarising the estimation results across various empirical exercises, consistent with 
aggregate country results, labour services growth is associated with lower labour productivity 
growth on account of the hours worked component embedded in the labour services variable. 
Across all sectors, the convergence effects can also be observed as picked up by the negative 
and in most cases statistically significant coefficients of the lagged real labour productivity 
level variable.16 
 
Finally, we also run pooled sectoral estimations with appropriate fixed effects included to 
control for year, country and sector effects (see Table 4.5). We look at both, pooling across all 
sectors, and across sector groups (primary, manufacturing and services). In the case of the all-
sector pooled estimation results SoftDB is positive, but only marginally significant (up to 5% 
level of statistical significance) with the marginal effect low at 0.03. For other capital assets 
the impacts are small in magnitude and/or statistically weakly significant or insignificant.  
 
Splitting the sample into sector groups yields more relevant results. The primary sector 
reveals a positive effect of RD and EconComp capital asset groups on labour productivity 
with marginal effects of 0.1 and 0.3, respectively. In the manufacturing sector group both 
EconComp and OInnProp capital growth have a negative productivity impact, while, notably, 
RD and SoftDB capital asset groups enter positively with a statistical significance of 1-5%. 
Estimates suggest that a 1-pp increase in the growth of real capital boosts labour productivity 
growth by about 0.1 pp in the case of SoftDB and 0.2 pp in the case of RD. Finally, the 
pooled services sector group does not reveal any significant effects associated with capital 
accumulation. Consistent with aggregate country and sector-specific results, in all cases the 
FDI variable is not significant. 
 
As a robustness check, in order to allow for the possibility of a delayed impact on 
productivity, we additionally explore deeper lags of the FDI variable: the results with the 3-
year lags are also included in Figure F.1. Using capital services growth rates instead of real 
capital stock growth yields largely identical results, as well as specifications with real inward 
FDI and real capital stocks by asset groups taken as a share of employment. The results are 
available upon request.  
 
 
                                              
15
 This holds for specifications involving the real capital stock and the alternative capital-to-labour ratio variable. 
16
 In both the aggregate country analysis and sector estimations deeper lags of the productivity level variables were also tried, yielding very 
similar results. 
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Table 4.4. Drivers of labour productivity: regressions with real capital and real inward FDI stock (1-year lag) growth rates 
Note: The dependent variable is real labour productivity (per hour worked) in log -differences. The table shows the estimation results using fixed effects with standard errors 
clustered by country (in parentheses). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Sector 20_POST  has an insufficient number of observations and 
therefore is omitted from the analysis. 
  1_AGRI 2_MING 3_FOOD 4_TXTL 5_WOOD 6_COKE 7_CHEM 8_RUBB 9_METL 10_ELEC 11_MACH 12_TRAN 13_OMAN 
                            
Ln (Labour productivity), lag -0.211*** -0.099*** -0.163* -0.404*** -0.092** -0.222* -0.231* -0.370*** -0.163** -0.108* -0.195*** -0.432*** -0.165** 
 
(0.050) (0.031) (0.085) (0.060) (0.040) (0.108) (0.115) (0.057) (0.061) (0.061) (0.039) (0.071) (0.060) 
ΔLn (Labour services) -0.478 -0.299*** -0.413* -0.873*** -0.350* 0.536 -0.349* -0.113 -0.325 -0.168 -0.386* 0.261* -0.512*** 
 
(0.273) (0.060) (0.209) (0.194) (0.163) (0.744) (0.186) (0.155) (0.186) (0.189) (0.201) (0.133) (0.143) 
ΔLn (EconComp, real capital stock) 0.284** 0.334* -0.246*** -0.003 0.155 -1.030 -0.223* -0.091 -0.095 0.025 0.061 0.216 -0.264** 
 
(0.119) (0.169) (0.078) (0.145) (0.122) (0.614) (0.118) (0.103) (0.092) (0.189) (0.076) (0.148) (0.097) 
ΔLn (ICT, real capital stock) -0.020 0.055 0.117** 0.063 0.065 -0.061 -0.039 -0.019 0.020 0.006 0.029 0.135** 0.034 
 
(0.055) (0.083) (0.053) (0.062) (0.047) (0.270) (0.064) (0.069) (0.054) (0.078) (0.040) (0.062) (0.041) 
ΔLn (NonICT, real capital stock) -0.420 0.106 0.137 0.080 -0.054 -1.189 0.497 -0.003 -0.026 0.285 -0.383** 0.069 0.253* 
 
(0.443) (0.223) (0.400) (0.497) (0.219) (0.702) (0.312) (0.189) (0.373) (0.278) (0.138) (0.419) (0.123) 
ΔLn (OInnProp, real capital stock) -0.150 -0.201 0.061 0.006 0.022 -1.015 0.112 -0.354* 0.062 -0.293 -0.187 -0.547* -0.366* 
 
(0.181) (0.145) (0.072) (0.203) (0.191) (1.105) (0.077) (0.164) (0.135) (0.223) (0.182) (0.295) (0.187) 
ΔLn (RD, real capital stock) -0.059 0.219** -0.164* -0.031 0.091 -0.324 0.121 -0.024 0.130 0.271 0.363* 0.209 0.207*** 
 
(0.075) (0.087) (0.085) (0.106) (0.068) (0.289) (0.208) (0.167) (0.110) (0.211) (0.176) (0.142) (0.053) 
ΔLn (SoftDB, real capital stock) -0.050 -0.036 -0.020 0.229*** -0.156** 0.973** -0.051 0.016 -0.032 -0.130 0.084* -0.131 -0.093 
 
(0.055) (0.051) (0.089) (0.062) (0.053) (0.361) (0.050) (0.036) (0.036) (0.096) (0.040) (0.107) (0.087) 
ΔLn (Inward FDI, real stock), lag 0.033* -0.004 -0.010 0.001 0.004 0.031 0.013 -0.001 -0.020 -0.023* -0.018 -0.003 0.005 
 
(0.017) (0.010) (0.008) (0.018) (0.016) (0.061) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007) 
              Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 100 153 132 106 104 76 122 109 138 120 136 113 109 
Adj. R-squared 0.268 0.270 0.308 0.517 0.222 0.347 0.130 0.464 0.350 0.389 0.567 0.565 0.642 
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Table 4.4 (cont.) 
  14_WATR 15_CONS 16_TRMO 17_WHTR 18_RETR 19_TRSR 21_ACCO 22_INFO 23_FINA 24_REAL 25_PROF 26_SOCI 
                          
Ln (Labour productivity), lag -0.198*** -0.144** -0.189** -0.124 -0.358** -0.440*** -0.266*** -0.071* -0.188** -0.268** -0.106*** -0.140** 
 
(0.061) (0.052) (0.073) (0.101) (0.096) (0.097) (0.065) (0.034) (0.073) (0.092) (0.030) (0.057) 
ΔLn (Labour services) -0.506*** -0.321** -0.253 0.178 -0.531** -0.178 -0.215 -0.400*** -0.207** -0.199 -0.398*** -0.318** 
 
(0.103) (0.139) (0.146) (0.441) (0.180) (0.154) (0.238) (0.112) (0.094) (0.125) (0.092) (0.125) 
ΔLn (EconComp, real capital stock) -0.066 -0.122 0.115 -0.046 -0.102 0.073 0.161* -0.082 -0.074 -0.213** 0.027 -0.003 
 
(0.089) (0.085) (0.187) (0.151) (0.173) (0.129) (0.090) (0.066) (0.210) (0.085) (0.050) (0.046) 
ΔLn (ICT, real capital stock) -0.013 -0.057 0.077 -0.176** -0.057 0.141 0.008 0.096* -0.035 -0.021 0.033 0.022 
 
(0.043) (0.040) (0.073) (0.062) (0.116) (0.098) (0.046) (0.052) (0.048) (0.049) (0.028) (0.014) 
ΔLn (NonICT, real capital stock) -0.286 0.397** -0.723* 0.087 0.023 0.274 0.583 -0.015 -0.198 0.144 0.171** 0.107 
 
(0.318) (0.154) (0.315) (0.333) (0.318) (0.344) (0.372) (0.100) (0.123) (0.468) (0.075) (0.090) 
ΔLn (OInnProp, real capital stock) 0.111 -0.000 0.230 -0.040 -0.214 0.049 0.114 0.128 -0.026 0.050 0.060 -0.021 
 
(0.275) (0.125) (0.181) (0.168) (0.158) (0.201) (0.067) (0.097) (0.071) (0.056) (0.062) (0.047) 
ΔLn (RD, real capital stock) 0.058 0.068* -0.031 -0.048 0.022 -0.053 -0.019 0.110* 0.021 -0.010 0.135** -0.038 
 
(0.069) (0.035) (0.035) (0.099) (0.066) (0.052) (0.028) (0.053) (0.035) (0.023) (0.056) (0.047) 
ΔLn (SoftDB, real capital stock) -0.133 -0.060 0.327** -0.019 -0.011 0.042 0.024 0.005 -0.062 0.000 -0.038 0.018 
 
(0.076) (0.045) (0.108) (0.068) (0.030) (0.065) (0.028) (0.039) (0.084) (0.028) (0.049) (0.025) 
ΔLn (Inward FDI, real stock), lag  0.010 -0.016* -0.017 0.011 0.030 0.009 0.015 -0.000 0.005 -0.005 0.002 0.000 
 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.028) (0.032) (0.022) (0.010) (0.016) (0.005) (0.015) (0.011) (0.004) (0.001) 
             Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 152 151 47 68 54 72 106 163 158 112 162 152 
Adj. R-squared 0.268 0.270 0.308 0.517 0.222 0.347 0.130 0.464 0.350 0.389 0.567 0.565 
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Table 4.5. Regressions with pooled sectors 
Note: The table shows the estimation results using fixed effects with standard errors clustered by country (in parentheses). The dependent variable is real labour productivity (per 
hour worked) in log-differences. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. Sector 20_POST  has an insufficient number of observations and therefore is  
omitted from the analysis. 
 
  Primary sectors   Manufacturing sectors   Services sectors   All sectors 
SEC 1-26 
 
SEC 1-2 
 
SEC 3-13 
 
SEC 14-26 
       
 
    
 
    
 
    
Ln (Labour productivity), lag -0.106*** -0.111*** 
 
-0.113 -0.095 
 
-0.127*** -0.148*** 
 
-0.104* -0.098* 
 
(0.029) (0.030) 
 
(0.074) (0.070) 
 
(0.024) (0.022) 
 
(0.054) (0.051) 
ΔLn (Inward FDI stock) 0.004 0.003 
 
-0.000 -0.005 
 
-0.003 -0.001 
 
-0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.010) 
 
(0.012) (0.011) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
ΔLn (EconComp, real capital stock) 0.311** 0.315** 
 
-0.292** -0.216*** 
 
-0.054 -0.060 
 
-0.124* -0.084 
 
(0.133) (0.142) 
 
(0.114) (0.071) 
 
(0.039) (0.044) 
 
(0.068) (0.058) 
ΔLn (ICT, real capital stock) 0.028 0.037 
 
0.016 0.020 
 
-0.010 -0.005 
 
0.015 0.013 
 
(0.047) (0.063) 
 
(0.038) (0.034) 
 
(0.015) (0.013) 
 
(0.014) (0.012) 
ΔLn (NonICT, real capital stock) -0.002 0.005 
 
-0.181 -0.223 
 
0.006 -0.008 
 
-0.069 -0.114 
 
(0.204) (0.221) 
 
(0.178) (0.229) 
 
(0.052) (0.056) 
 
(0.094) (0.133) 
ΔLn (OInnProp, real capital stock) -0.193 -0.201 
 
-0.332* -0.251** 
 
0.048 0.062 
 
-0.148* -0.091 
 
(0.142) (0.139) 
 
(0.163) (0.115) 
 
(0.036) (0.038) 
 
(0.078) (0.063) 
ΔLn (RD, real capital stock) 0.121* 0.148** 
 
0.233** 0.185*** 
 
-0.013 -0.004 
 
0.035 0.037** 
 
(0.062) (0.067) 
 
(0.088) (0.058) 
 
(0.009) (0.014) 
 
(0.021) (0.015) 
ΔLn (Soft_DB, real capital stock) -0.038 -0.031 
 
0.097** 0.119*** 
 
0.006 -0.005 
 
0.030 0.034** 
 
(0.049) (0.046) 
 
(0.035) (0.039) 
 
(0.023) (0.014) 
 
(0.018) (0.013) 
ΔLn (Labour services) -0.291*** -0.309*** 
 
-0.143 -0.287* 
 
-0.271*** -0.330*** 
 
-0.201*** -0.310*** 
 
(0.075) (0.067) 
 
(0.155) (0.144) 
 
(0.070) (0.079) 
 
(0.056) (0.062) 
            Country-sector FE yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Year FE yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
 Sector-year FE 
 
yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
  
yes 
Observations 253 253 
 
1,265 1,265 
 
1,414 1,414 
 
2,932 2,932 
Adj. R-squared 0.313 0.376  0.214 0.397  0.219 0.417  0.141 0.367 
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4.5 Implications for productivity gaps between countries 
 
In this section, we illustrate the order of magnitude of the effects identified in the previous 
sections and their possible impact on inter-country productivity gaps by making two example 
calculations. First, we estimate how increasing the level of tangible (intangible) ICT capital 
per person employed in EU countries to US levels affects labour productivity in a given year. 
We assume that only countries with below-US levels of ICT capital per person employed 
increase their ICT investment; otherwise, their ICT investment remains unchanged. Second, 
we look at a hypothetical ICT investment package of 100bn EUR distributed according to 
population across EU countries. We further assume that everything else remains constant, 
which leads to a relatively rough estimate. Nevertheless, it gives an idea of the contribution of 
ICT capital, both tangible and intangible, to inter-country productivity gaps. 
 
There are large differences between EU countries in the levels of both tangible and intangible 
ICT capital per person employed. Figure 4.1 compares (in) tangible ICT capital levels (in 
2010 EUR) per 1000 persons employed across different countries. Countries with levels 
below those of the US are marked in green, countries above US levels are marked in red. This 
figure demonstrates that most EU countries are below US levels – an effect more pronounced 
for tangible ICT capital (left panel) than for intangible ICT capital (right panel). 
 
Figure 4.1 
Note: ICT capital (in mn 2010 EUR) per 1000 persons employed in 2015. Left panel: tangible ICT capital, right panel: 
intangible ICT capital. 
 
 
We find that increasing tangible ICT capital per 1000 persons employed in the EU to US 
levels leads to an increase of 7.1(±2.3)% in population-weighted labour productivity and a 
reduction of the EU-US productivity gap of 25.2(±8.4)%. For intangible ICT capital, EU 
productivity increases by 7.9(±2.6)% and the EU-US productivity gap is reduced by 
28.3(±8.6)%. 
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In this paragraph, we analyse the effect of a hypothetical 100bn EUR investment in 
tangible/intangible capital in 2014 on labour productivity in 2015. We assume that the share 
each EU country receives is proportional to its population, and that only countries with a 
lower ICT per person employed level than the USA receive funding. We find that such a 
policy would increase population-weighted average labour productivity in the EU by 
1.7(±0.6)% for tangible ICT capital, and 2.7(±0.9)% for intangible ICT capital. The 
productivity gap between the US and the EU would be reduced by 6.1(±2.0)% and 
9.5(±3.1)%, respectively. The corresponding change in ICT capital per person employed is 
illustrated in Figure 4.2 below. 
 
Figure 4.2 
Note: Change in ICT capital (in mn 2010 EUR) per 1000 persons employed corresponding to 100bn EUR investment  in 
2015. Left panel: tangible ICT capital, right panel: intangible ICT capital.  
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5. Policy implications and concluding remarks 
Low productivity growth has been a major challenge in the post-crisis period in a large 
number of EU countries. Some countries have been affected comparatively more than others, 
which has led to pronounced productivity gaps, both within the EU and between EU countries 
and economies such as the US and Japan. The aim of this paper is to measure the impact of 
different drivers of productivity growth, such as to enhance our understanding of recent 
productivity dynamics. For that purpose, we perform an econometric analysis of the drivers of 
productivity, looking in particular at the accumulation of different types of capital (including 
intangible capital), foreign direct investment, integration into global value chains and EU 
integration.  
 
We find that ICT capital, both tangible and intangible, has a significant positive impact on 
productivity. The effect of intangible ICT capital even exceeds that of tangible capital: a 1-pp 
increase in the intangible ICT capital growth rate is associated with a 0.09 pp increase in real 
labour productivity growth, while this number is 0.06 pp for a 1-pp increase in the growth rate 
of tangible ICT capital. In fact, intangible ICT capital is the only capital asset type that 
robustly emerged as a driver of productivity across multiple model specifications at the 
sectoral and aggregate levels.  
 
Furthermore, we find that higher levels of integration in value chains and in particular 
backward GVC integration is associated with productivity growth: Increasing backward GVC 
participation by 0.01 induces a 0.2 pp increase in the growth of aggregate labour productivity 
(the mean year-to-year change in backward GVC participation is 0.005).17 Our results also 
suggest that EU integration has been essential for productivity growth, confirming earlier 
studies (see e.g. Kutan and Yigit, 2007, 2009). There may be multiple channels through which 
this happens, including regulatory convergence and upgrading of institutions, co-funding of 
infrastructure and efficiency gains due to a more efficient cross-border reallocation of 
productive resources. Finally, we did not find evidence for a productivity-enhancing effect of 
FDI, which is in line with the hypothesis that EU inward FDI is targeted at countries with 
already high levels of productivity, reducing its potential to further advance productivity 
growth (Hale and Xu, 2016). 
 
Europe has all the necessary ingredients to boost innovation and innovation-driven 
productivity, including a skilled workforce, strong institutions and research infrastructure. 
However, more efforts are needed to mobilise them and to channel them into the real 
economy in order to narrow productivity gaps within the EU and not fall behind peer 
economies outside the EU. 
 
Our estimates suggest that, ceteris paribus, if all lagging EU countries increased their levels of 
tangible ICT capital per person employed US levels, population-weighted mean productivity 
                                              
17
 This is intuitive, as participation in global value chains provides an opportunity for productivity gains due to knowledge 
spillovers from MNEs and efficiency gains associated with greater specialisation in certain tasks. This result also confirms earlier 
studies on GVC participation and productivity (Kummritz, 2016, Jona-Lasinio and Meliciani, 2019 and Pahl and Timmer, 2019).  
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levels in the EU would increase by 7.1%. For intangible ICT capital, productivity growth in 
the EU would increase by 7.9%. This would imply a decrease of 25.2% and 28.3%, 
respectively, in the gap in labour productivity levels between the EU and the US. Despite their 
approximate nature, these estimates give a rough idea of the order of magnitude of the effects 
of ICT capital on labour productivity. Looking instead at a 100bn EUR EU-wide investment 
plan for countries with below-US levels of (in)tangible ICT capital per person employed, 
would yield a 1.7% (2.7%) increase in average EU labour productivity levels and a 
corresponding reduction in the EU-US productivity gap of 6.1% (9.5%). These findings are in 
line with earlier literature that stresses the importance of different levels of tangible ICT 
capital in explaining the labour productivity gap between the EU and the US (Timmer and van 
Ark, 2005; Cette et al., 2015). We add to this literature by using more recent data and by 
analysing the role of intangible ICT capital. 
 
Our results demonstrate that policies promoting a more efficient allocation of investment in 
both tangible and intangible ICT capital might be highly conducive for labour productivity 
and might reduce the productivity gap to the US significantly. This outcome is even more 
relevant, as ICT capital affects the entire economy through various channels and thus 
constitutes a general purpose technology. Discussing policies to facilitate the accumulation of 
ICT capital such as creating tax incentives, infrastructure investment and fostering learning of 
ICT skills, goes beyond the scope of this paper, but is treated at length in Adarov and Stehrer 
(2020).  
 
Further, our results refute Solow’s computer paradox, which states “[y]ou can see the 
computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics” (Solow, 1987). This statement has 
been receiving renewed interest recently, for example in Acemoglu et al. (2014). On the 
contrary, our findings highlight the important roles ICT capital and especially intangible ICT 
play in boosting productivity. The lack of visible productivity accelerations in Europe may 
thus in part be attributed to underinvestment in digital capital. Our findings provide further 
empirical support for the necessity of additional policy efforts targeted at the efficient 
adoption of ICT capital, both tangible and intangible, which is especially vital for the EU in 
light of its relatively weak post-crisis productivity and growth performance. Moving the 
digital transformation forward via ICT capital investment may further enhance convergence 
between EU Member States and thereby improve its internal cohesion and resilience. Finally, 
the COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated that digital infrastructure is not only at the forefront of 
tracking and combatting the virus, but that it is also crucial in mitigating the effects of the 
ensuing economic crisis. 
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Appendix A. Summary statistics 
Table A1. Summary statistics for aggregate country-level variables 
Variable Variable description N mean median std. dev. min max 
ΔLn (Labour productivity) Growth of value added per hour worked,  chain-linked 2010 USD 216 0.012 0.010 0.017 -0.032 0.068 
Ln (Labour productivity) Value added per hour worked, chain-linked  2010 USD 216 -3.215 -3.033 0.461 -4.438 -2.625 
ΔLn (Inward FDI stock) Growth of inward FDI stock, chain-linked 2010 USD 211 0.051 0.046 0.121 -0.272 0.319 
ΔLn (Labour services) Growth of labour services 216 0.008 0.010 0.022 -0.182 0.062 
ΔLn (EconComp, real capital stock) EconComp, chain-linked 2010 USD 216 0.030 0.026 0.047 -0.111 0.206 
ΔLn (ICT, real capital stock) ICT, chain-linked 2010 USD 216 0.041 0.042 0.056 -0.107 0.186 
ΔLn (NonICT, real capital stock) NonICT, chain-linked 2010 USD 216 0.011 0.010 0.013 -0.018 0.048 
ΔLn (OInnProp, real capital stock) OInnProp, chain-linked 2010 USD 216 0.020 0.027 0.035 -0.106 0.133 
ΔLn (RD, real capital stock) RD, chain-linked 2010 USD 216 0.025 0.022 0.032 -0.069 0.148 
ΔLn (SoftDB, real capital stock) SoftDB, chain-linked 2010 USD 216 0.037 0.036 0.045 -0.141 0.199 
Labour composition growth Labour composition growth 216 0.006 0.005 0.007 -0.021 0.032 
ΔLn (Hours worked) Growth of hours worked 216 0.002 0.005 0.022 -0.180 0.035 
ΔLn (Inward FDI stock, share of employed) Growth of inward FDI stock, chain-linked 2010 USD, as a share of employed 211 0.070 0.055 0.132 -0.263 0.414 
Δ GVC_BWI Change in backward GVC participation 179 0.005 0.003 0.016 -0.049 0.044 
Δ GVC_FWI Change in forward GVC participation 179 0.002 0.002 0.008 -0.030 0.022 
Δ Control of corruption Change in the WB WGI Control of corruption estimate 204 -0.008 -0.002 0.086 -0.287 0.242 
Δ Government effectiveness Change in the WB WGI Government effectiveness estimate 204 -0.011 -0.007 0.120 -0.670 0.299 
Labour force with advanced education Labor force with advanced educ. (% of working-age population with adv. educ.) 207 79.038 78.243 3.791 73.250 89.974 
Labour force with basic education Labor force with basic educ. (% of total working-age population with basic ed.) 205 38.729 37.631 11.679 13.960 68.337 
Δ Private credit -to-GDP Change in private credit by deposit money banks, % of GDP  205 0.480 0.135 6.525 -18.350 26.370 
Δ Human capital index Change in the human capital index 216 0.015 0.016 0.007 0.002 0.050 
 
Source: own computations 
  
 
41 
 
Figure A1. National Accounts asset breakdown 
 
Note: Asset types are based on ESA'2010 definition. Those w ith a code are available at Eurostat (yellow /orange), others not (grey ). 
Source: Adarov and Stehrer (2019a) 
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Figure A2. Productivity dynamics by sectors (growth rates) 
Note: The figure shows real labour productivity growth rates for the 26 sectors as outlined in Table 2.2. The figures in dicat e  
2000-2017 averages along with the pre-crisis and post-crisis period averages (with and without the double-dip recession 
period). Countries are sorted by ISO3 in alphabetic order. EU28 indicates average EU-28 values. 
1_AGRI 2_MING 
  
3_FOOD 4_TXTL 
  
5_WOOD 6_COKE 
  
Source: own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 data. 
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Figure A2 (cont.) 
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9_METL 10_ELEC 
  
11_MACH 12_TRAN 
  
Source: own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 data. 
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Figure A2 (cont.) 
 
13_OMAN 14_GASW 
  
15_CONS 16_TRMO 
  
17_WHTR 18_RETR 
  
Source: own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 data. 
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Figure A2 (cont.) 
 
19_TRSR 20_POST  
  
21_ACCO 22_INFO 
  
23_FINA 24_REAL 
  
Source: own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 data. 
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Figure A2 (cont.) 
 
25_PROF 26_SOCI 
  
Source: own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 data. 
 
Table A2. Capital asset composition by sectors (average across countries and years 2000-2017) 
SEC EconComp ICT NonICT OInnProp RD Soft_DB 
1_AGRI 0.22% 0.48% 98.42% 0.44% 0.29% 0.14% 
2_MING 0.79% 0.84% 89.66% 6.70% 1.60% 0.41% 
3_FOOD 5.37% 1.25% 87.17% 1.31% 3.58% 1.32% 
4_TXTL 3.31% 1.04% 86.83% 1.26% 5.65% 1.91% 
5_WOOD 2.11% 2.65% 89.05% 1.31% 3.14% 1.73% 
6_COKE 2.23% 1.42% 88.75% 2.09% 4.29% 1.23% 
7_CHEM 2.78% 1.24% 61.70% 1.22% 31.42% 1.64% 
8_RUBB 2.60% 1.44% 85.72% 1.52% 7.23% 1.50% 
9_METL 2.41% 1.71% 86.15% 1.66% 6.43% 1.63% 
10_ELEC 2.92% 2.58% 41.68% 1.67% 46.04% 5.11% 
11_MACH 3.58% 1.59% 65.69% 3.03% 22.65% 3.46% 
12_TRAN 2.64% 1.70% 62.00% 2.34% 28.69% 2.62% 
13_OMAN 3.99% 1.70% 73.58% 2.49% 14.79% 3.46% 
14_GASW 0.62% 1.30% 95.88% 0.86% 0.75% 0.59% 
15_CONS 2.03% 0.76% 84.35% 11.75% 0.49% 0.61% 
16_TRMO 7.45% 1.77% 86.34% 1.72% 0.70% 2.01% 
17_WHTR 9.88% 3.39% 74.63% 3.52% 3.55% 5.02% 
18_RETR 6.18% 3.02% 86.10% 1.23% 0.41% 3.05% 
19_TRSR 0.99% 1.45% 95.89% 0.77% 0.23% 0.67% 
20_POST  3.37% 6.82% 77.76% 2.40% 2.08% 7.56% 
21_ACCO 2.78% 1.71% 94.13% 0.78% 0.06% 0.54% 
22_INFO 4.26% 14.90% 60.20% 7.18% 5.03% 8.43% 
23_FINA 6.31% 3.66% 77.11% 1.65% 1.81% 9.46% 
24_REAL 0.07% 0.05% 99.61% 0.25% 0.00% 0.02% 
25_PROF 9.15% 4.48% 61.09% 8.36% 13.35% 3.56% 
26_SOCI 0.75% 1.21% 91.64% 0.96% 4.56% 0.88% 
 
Source: own computations based on the EU KLEMS 2019 data. 
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Appendix B. Additional country-level regression results  
Table B3. Regression results with alternative outlier thresholds 
 
Note: The table shows the estimation results using fixed effects (FE) with standard errors clustered by country (in parenthes es). The 
dependent variable is ΔLn (Labour productivity). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.  The estimates reported in  
columns correspond to the baseline specification with different levels of outlier threshold imposed on the key variables  (labour productivity, 
FDI and capital asset growth rates): ‘µ ± 2σ’, ‘µ ± 3σ’, ‘µ ± 4σ’ denote threshold levels at 2, 3 and 4 standard deviations from the sample 
mean. The former corresponds to the baseline model. Column ‘no outlier cutoff’ lists results with all observations (no outlier control).  
 
  µ ± 2σ µ ± 3σ µ ± 4σ no outlier cutoff 
          
Ln (Labour productivity), lag -0.122*** -0.132*** -0.143*** -0.151*** 
 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.027) (0.023) 
ΔLn (Labour services) -0.333*** -0.293*** -0.246** -0.155 
 
(0.073) (0.091) (0.093) (0.101) 
ΔLn (Inward FDI stock) -0.012 -0.015* -0.011 -0.009 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
ΔLn (EconComp, real capital stock) -0.039* 0.004 0.009 0.029 
 
(0.020) (0.025) (0.030) (0.022) 
ΔLn (ICT, real capital stock) 0.055** 0.036** 0.029* 0.015 
 
(0.021) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) 
ΔLn (NonICT, real capital stock) -0.037 0.013 0.058 -0.295 
 
(0.122) (0.115) (0.132) (0.263) 
ΔLn (OInnProp, real capital stock) -0.002 -0.035 -0.002 0.005 
 
(0.050) (0.034) (0.029) (0.028) 
ΔLn (RD, real capital stock) 0.046 0.045 -0.022 0.016 
 
(0.039) (0.040) (0.053) (0.051) 
ΔLn (SoftDB, real capital stock) 0.085** 0.033** 0.015 0.004** 
 
(0.031) (0.014) (0.017) (0.002) 
Constant -0.370*** -0.404*** -0.441*** -0.468*** 
 
(0.066) (0.063) (0.087) (0.076) 
     Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 233 238 248 
Adj. R-squared 0.581 0.554 0.508 0.494 
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Table B4. Summary statistics with alternative outlier thresholds 
 
Note: The table shows summary statistics for the regression variables with different levels of outlier threshold imposed on the key variables 
(labour productivity, FDI and capital asset growth rates): ‘µ ± 2σ’, ‘µ ± 3σ’, ‘µ ± 4σ’ denote threshold levels at 2, 3 and 4 standard deviations  
from the sample mean; ‘no outlier cutoff’ lists results with all observations (no outlier control). 
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µ ± 2σ 
N 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 
mean 0.012 -3.215 0.008 0.043 0.030 0.041 0.011 0.020 0.025 0.037 
sd 0.017 0.461 0.022 0.147 0.047 0.056 0.013 0.035 0.032 0.045 
min -0.032 -4.438 -0.182 -0.597 -0.111 -0.107 -0.018 -0.106 -0.069 -0.141 
max 0.068 -2.625 0.062 0.483 0.206 0.186 0.048 0.133 0.148 0.199 
µ ± 3σ 
N 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 
mean 0.013 -3.248 0.007 0.043 0.030 0.037 0.011 0.019 0.025 0.036 
sd 0.019 0.483 0.022 0.148 0.055 0.060 0.013 0.044 0.034 0.066 
min -0.054 -4.438 -0.182 -0.597 -0.144 -0.238 -0.018 -0.158 -0.069 -0.363 
max 0.079 -2.625 0.062 0.483 0.289 0.186 0.048 0.223 0.186 0.493 
µ ± 4σ 
N 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 
mean 0.012 -3.251 0.006 0.041 0.030 0.039 0.011 0.019 0.025 0.039 
sd 0.020 0.484 0.023 0.150 0.060 0.066 0.012 0.045 0.040 0.074 
min -0.061 -4.438 -0.182 -0.597 -0.144 -0.238 -0.018 -0.158 -0.164 -0.363 
max 0.079 -2.625 0.062 0.483 0.372 0.445 0.048 0.223 0.272 0.507 
no outlier cutoff 
N 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 
mean 0.012 -3.271 0.006 0.038 0.034 0.037 0.011 0.020 0.025 0.040 
sd 0.021 0.495 0.023 0.153 0.075 0.116 0.013 0.052 0.040 0.158 
min -0.092 -4.438 -0.182 -0.597 -0.144 -0.818 -0.018 -0.181 -0.164 -0.790 
max 0.079 -2.625 0.062 0.483 0.598 1.005 0.090 0.303 0.272 1.942 
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Appendix C: Additional capital dynamics  
 
Figure C.1 Real capital stocks per person employed by asset groups, 2010 USD 
Note: the figure shows real capital stock per person employed (in 2010 USD) by asset group; averages over the period 2000-
2006 and 2010-2017. Countries are listed by ISO3 in alphabetic order. 
  
  
  
Source: own computations based on EU KLEMS 2019 data 
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Appendix D. Marginal effects of sectoral productivity analysis 
 
Figure D.1. Marginal impact of FDI, ICT and non-ICT capital on labour productivity by sector 
Note: The figure shows the average estimated marginal impact of capital (by aggregate capital asset groups) and inward FDI  
stock on real labour productivity growth, along with the 90% and 99% confidence intervals (indicated light and dark blue 
bars, respectively). Capital and FDI variables are real stocks (2010 USD) in log-differences. The regression results associated 
with the estimates are reported in Appendix Table B1 (Panel B1-A for the six capital asset and FDI 3-year lag estim at es an d 
Panel B1-B for the FDI 1-year lag estimates). Sector 20_POST lacks sufficient observations for robust estimations (omitted). 
NonICT ICT 
  
  
RD SoftDB 
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Figure D.1 (cont.) 
  
Inward FDI stock (1-year lag) Inward FDI stock (3-year lag) 
  
  
Source: own calculations 
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